岁月的拾荒者

      在发表于一九八一年七月的一篇文章中，阿根廷作家胡利奥·科塔萨尔提到了一个幻想故事。
      一群阿根廷人决定在一片适宜的平原上建造一座城市，但是他们中的大多数人不知道盖房子的地方是一块墓地，它一点昔日的痕迹也没留下来。只有头头们知道这一点，但他们保持着沉默，因为这是他们整体计划的一部分。
      新城市建成了，明亮的灯光与繁荣景象让人骄傲。但也在同时，一种奇怪的骚扰出现了，人们产生了怀疑和担心，总觉得某种奇特的力量在干扰、控告他们，竭力赶走他们。
      最敏感的人终于明白，他们是住在墓地上，死者以他们的方式回来了，走进人们的家中、梦中和幸福中。
      “这似乎是我们时代的某种理想得到了实现，我是说，这是一种技术上的胜利，是被电视机、冰箱、电影、大批金钱和爱国主义的自足包围的现代生活的胜利”，科塔萨尔在讲述完这个故事后评论说，“它慢慢的惊醒了最可怕的噩梦，惊醒了寒冷而粘滞地存在的无形的鄙弃和一种诅咒。这种诅咒难以言表，但是将其不可言喻的恐怖传染给了那些人在墓地上建造的一切。”
      “科塔萨尔借由这个故事来说明一九七零年代末流行的‘阿根廷模式’。在经过一个动荡不安的时期后，现任军政府给阿根廷带来了表面的平静。国际舆论都认定阿根廷正在‘进入一个物质生活和国家政治生活积极稳定的时期’。至于之前几年，政府对于反对派力量的大规模清洗，则没人再提。阿根廷正展示着它的新面貌，成功举办了一九七八的世界杯，还在重工业和核能源进行积极探索。而对于这一切，科塔萨尔写到：‘一个不同的、畸形的现实已经形成，它像一座迅速安装、掩盖着基础的舞台那样耸立。这是一个由劳动阶级的屈从和贫困形成的基础，是一个蔑视一切思想和表现的自由基础，是一个使用着在这种情况下总是有效的爱国语言和沙文语言的无耻和实用的基础。’”（英国《金融时报》专栏作家，许知远）
      这周二11月11日晚，国际关系学院的一群韩国学生精心策划了一个多月的中国问题讨论会如期举行。中国的食品安全与韩国对中国外交政策是本次会议的主题。有幸作为中国学生之一被邀请参加此次会议。对有点表演性质的会议本身，我不想多说什么，毕竟我也没做什么贡献，那些韩国学生也真辛苦了。当时觉得参加这种会议有点nonsense。现在读了科塔萨尔的这则现实折射性非常强烈的幻想故事以及许知远先生的对此引发的对奶粉的隐喻的深刻思考，竟也开始后知后觉起来，发现这种会议的必要性。
      确实，改革开放三十年造就的“繁荣盛世”里，灯光明亮，霓虹璀璨，让我们无比自豪骄傲。“但也在同时，一种奇怪的骚扰出现了，人们产生了怀疑和担心，总觉得某种奇特的力量在干扰、控告他们，竭力赶走他们。最敏感的人终于明白，他们是住在墓地上，死者以他们的方式回来了，走进人们的家中、梦中和幸福中。”
      ——科塔萨尔预言的，这墓地的诅咒在中国又何尝不是如此呢？
      “头头们”在干嘛？官商勾结，“政府权力退出的空间，迅速被商业机构占领，而政府自身也正迅速朝向商业机构演变——它自身成为一个个利益团体。”
      “整体计划”是什么？让经济学家张五常赞叹不已的“中国制度”，不正是他所谓的二千两百个县，像是两千两百个公司那样运转，他们在出卖土地、招商引资方面表现出强烈的饥饿感……
      “奇怪的骚扰”多了去了，腐败、社会阶层流动、公共安全事件、贫富差距……
      “最敏感的人”躲哪儿去了？媒体的社会责任何在？公共话语权被绑架在哪个荒原野草地里奄奄一息？
      “墓地”，发生了那么多不幸的事，我们是否该怀疑我们是不是正坐在充满魔咒的墓地上唱响繁荣笙歌呢？
      或者，我们本不必如此悲观。隔岸观火、洁身自好，是充分的自我保护同时也是自我封闭的盔甲。或者，这种冷漠也是一种迷恋特权的隐性显现：“人们是如此迷恋特权。只有你在人群中的最上层，才可能过上一个基本安全的生活；只有特权，才可能尽量减少生活中残酷一面对你的压迫，或许正是因为饱尝那些压迫，那些人一旦获得特权，立刻表现出变本加厉的冷漠和傲慢。” 又或者，更显然的“这是系统问题”。
      我们迷恋的东西与这种种系统的千丝万缕的暧昧关系，或许能为发生在“墓地”上的诅咒作出些有理有据的解释（但决不允许是辩解）；然后，我们是否允许和纵容暧昧关系继续生龙活虎等等，这里面总是有太多问题要解释，太多理论待理解，这些更是活生生任重而道远。

    敲下这个逻辑错乱的标题，心生几许惘然：这是写给明年的自己，还是为了至多到明年的忘却的纪念？了然于心也好，不知亦可，算是一种前瞻的忘却，而为了这种无情的忘却，今天趁着火热纪念一下这份心情。
    两个多月来，有幸碰到了很多好人——中国人、韩国人……他们真的对我们很好，与那几个韩国朋友语言沟通的障碍有时反而让我们之间的交流变得纯粹。他们英语水平不是很好，我的也不好，但就是蹩脚的英语（Korgilish和Chinglish）活生生磨合出一套简洁又可爱的话语体系，只有在我们之间才彼此很容易地反应过来对方所说的是什么内容，外人则无法做到。很多时候，我在思量着人类（我们）还真能行，这么磨合也可以的。在这里几个月来生活得很纯粹，韩语慢慢在长进，但可以肯定的是到下个月我离开的时候还是无法用韩语跟他们大侃特侃，不然我就是语言天才了。此前问过来留学的朝鲜族小马哥，朝鲜语作为他的母语之一，在这里是不是非常方便等；当时不明白小马哥说的，朝鲜语作为他的母语之一并没有让他感觉很好，除了生活的方便之处。现在看来短时间内，比如说像我在这里只呆4个月，做做不懂韩语的可爱的外国人也挺好的，估摸是可以免去很多复杂的人际关系诸如此类。毕竟，很多时候我们就喜欢自讨苦吃，沟通越是方便，所谓关系越复杂。
    在这里一边纯纯地过着每一天，一边念念不忘回去即将面对的现实，真的很现实：不少课程学分要补，不少考试要考，不少人要见，很多为了生存东西要准备……很容易就可以想象得出的明年的生活轨迹，会很充实，也会有点无奈吧，又或者我可以更“诗意”地享受那种生活呢。
    所以，在接下来的一个多月时间里多练练英语、多学学韩语，是否也为了很近的将来的用途而已；或者同时也要好好珍惜做一个傻傻的外国人的单纯的殊荣呢？都有，也都要的。
    但是，心知肚明的是，回去之后很容易随着时间的流逝渐渐淡忘在这里经历的一切，尽管有文字佐证，有照片定格。就是因为即将会那样发生的或是很正常的无奈、或是更无情的忘却，现在还是要抓紧时间拍照纪念，抓紧时间敲下些想法——尽管是为了忘却的，纪念。有些行为正统的想法是框不住的，明知还是会故犯的，就如这为了忘却的纪念。情何以堪，如此形式的纪念？

Although China and Japan share a variety of commonalties in culture and structures, both countries have taken different paths to development. How do you explain this phenomenon, and what are the most important factors that put these two Asian neighbors into the dissimilar situation?

Francis Moulder《Japan, China and the Modern World Economy》
1.    Traditional society theory

Japan is the only Third World nation that had a culture and social structure favorable to economic development.

Various factors: Insularity; feudal loyalty, religion; “goal orientation”;”diversity and pragmatism of thought”; the military character of the ruling class; nationalism; relative advancement of the traditional economy; breakdown of traditional class structure; and the existence of an “imperial institution”. 
2.    World economy theory

Japan is the only Third World nation that remained relatively insulated from pressures to become a satellite within the world system.
      The degree of incorporation in the international economy that accounts for the differences in governmental efforts.
      China became incorporated into the world economy as a satellite(附庸国) while Japan managed to avoid such incorporation. The state must play the key role in modern economic growth. Where the Chinese state was preoccupied with fending off foreign encroachments(侵犯) and paying off large indemnities, the Japanese state was left alone(comparatively speaking) to develop its strength.
      Japan did not become a colony, this permitted the establishment of a capitalist-dominated regime that promoted the interests of industrialization.
      There was no large influx of Western traders, adventurers, and missionaries, and the Japanese were not stirred to xenophobic (恐外的) reactions against everything Western, which might have hampered industrialization, as were the Chinese case.

The significant difference between Japan and China, however, was not Japan’s special social structure but its greater independence from 19^th century imperialism. 
3.    Class theory of industrialization(前两种理论共同关注点)

Two assumptions: (1) Industrialization is primarily the inevitable result of the appearance of a class that support it (bourgeoisie); (2) A state policy of promoting industrialization if also necessary.

In the various traditional society comparisons of Japan and China:

Political structures: Japan developed during the 19^th century because it had a “feudal” tradition similar to the societies of Europe. China remained underdeveloped because it had a “bureaucratic” (or “centralized” or ”despotic” or ”Asiatic”) tradition, radically different from the Western or Japanese experience.
Japan: in the half-century after the initial confrontation with the threat of Western imperialism, Japan was able to build a centralized nation-state.
1)On an administrative level, this involved the abolition of the more than 200 largely autonomous domains into which the country had been divided during the Tokugawa period, and the subsequent creation of a nationwide administrative structure directly accountable to the new Meiji government.
2)Cultural integration: It also involved the successful mobilization of a critical mass of local leaders to serve in this new government and carry out its initiatives at the local level. In addition, the process of centralization in Japan involved integrating ordinary people into the institutions of the modern state and cultivating among those people a personal identification with the nation.
3)Many of the institutional reforms carried out by the Meiji government, in schooling, the military etc, were indeed based on Western models.
[历史描述：Japan was feudal state, a conglomerate of domains ruled by a warrior nobility, or daimyo(大名), and hegemony (统治) was exercised by the most powerful Tokugawa(德川) domain. Social order: daimyo（大名）→samurai（武士）→merchant→artisan(工匠)→peasant classes. The importance of the feudal state is that it is weak vis-à-vis the nobility and bourgeoisie. The Tokugawa rulers were unable to prevent the rise of commerce and the development of an increasingly powerful and wealthy bourgeois class in town and countryside. “Commercialization” began to erode the feudal social order in several important ways. After Europeans’ intervention, the two disaffected classes (bourgeoisie and lower-ranking samurai) united to overthrow the Tokugawa government and establish a new state (the Meiji Restoration). The new Meiji government abolished Tokugawa restrains on commerce and industry and undertook many reforms that further industrialization. ]

China: the Chinese imperial state was a strong or bureaucratic state. China was ruled by the Manchu conquerors through a centralized officialdom.
      This officialdom was drawn from the Chinese landed upper class, but power in China was based on officeholding rather than domain ownership as in Japan. 
      The Chinese bureaucracy was opposed to the rise of commerce, and because the state was strong it was able to contain the rise of commerce and the growth of a powerful bourgeoisie. Because there was no bourgeoisie in China with which a segment of the ruling class might ally, China’s rulers remained conservative; no Chinese equivalent of the Meiji Restoration could occur after the arrival of the Europeans. China was thus compelled to remain underdeveloped.

    今天中午刚结束中国政治经济（Political Economy of China）的期中考试，胸膛中的忐忑间歇性休止——“电风扇原理”的全英文闭卷考试。虽说讲的是中国近现代史的政治经济，这些我们在高中历史书上基本上都学过，但是：第一，我不喜欢在考试的时候真的像“电风扇”那样傻乎乎地胡诌一番，再怎么说也得胸中有物才吐得出墨水来；第二，最基本也是最关键的是，这方面的英文书我看得太少，不是历史系出身，很多历史名词的英文表达还是初次见面，既熟悉又陌生的新鲜感觉真是奇妙。还好，Pro. Keum 事先给了些题目范围，这几天为了这个小样儿期中考试还真是搞得神经兮兮，又是狂读英文版的中国历史书，又是检索文献，又是做总结写观点的……总之，考试还是王道，总是得让什么东西逼着才学习，做学生搞学习弄得这么狼狈好像看着很普遍，但总归觉得有点儿犯贱。（O_O ）
    不过话说回来，脑袋在像是被吹气球似的膨胀的同时，人也落个欣慰。有人说过，大学本科阶段就是一个不断被洗脑的过程——祛除中学生的单纯、天真和偏见。在这里学中国政治经济，或者简单地说就是上“中国政治经济”这门课，用英语讲授和讨论总比为应付高考而机械学习高中历史书上的正统（orthodoxy）历史知识来得中立而有意思一点。有时还看看电影，比如张艺谋的被禁播14年后最近貌似又现“复活”迹象的《活着》，不错。【《活着》是中国式的黑色幽默片，主人公福贵的遭遇异常凄惨。影片透过一个人的一生遭遇，涵盖着人在历史中的命运无法掌控的生命之痛，衍生出了对死亡的苦笑。在福贵的一生当中，最初的纸醉金迷，到五颗枪子的恐惧，到儿子夭亡时的悲愤控诉，到女儿意外去世时的无奈接受，影片结尾时吃饭时的辛酸苦乐，个人命运随波逐流，被历史牵引。《活着》是跨越年代的较长的一部影片，历史浓缩为个人的命运。命如蝼蚁般的个人命运，只能产生枉自兴叹的生命之痛。】
     邂逅期中考试的同时，也在文献中邂逅了一个University of Connecticut （康涅狄格大学，美国） 的社会学系教授Francis Moulder。 此人撰有一本近代亚洲史方面的书《日本、中国和近代世界经济》（《Japan China and Modern World Economy》，1977年出版）。虽然只是为了回答琴教授的题目而看了这本书，也只是看了它的Introduction部分，社会学系出身的Francis Moulder 搬出了韦伯和马克思，从他俩各自的传统社会理论和世界经济理论角度，基于对19世纪以来中国的underdeveloped和日本的developed的历史事实，洋洋洒洒而又细致深入地剖析了他俩人的分析范式运用于此的问题和困境。后来还提到19世纪的中国、日本与欧洲发展模式的比较及理论分析，看的我有点头昏。不过，总的来说，12页的英文看下来还是有少见的酣畅淋漓的痛快。再次欣欣然发觉社会学理论一点也不是on the shelf 的清高而无用。
    好了，结束冠冕堂皇的小感叹，在开了暖气的小屋里一大盒子的小红番茄已经消失一大半，清凉爽口又爽心。前阵子太无趣，说是不多愁善感，实则还是感性了，这样不好。
    再说回来，一个学期已然过了一大半，我要怎么个样回去还是个问题。

    Disillusion: what is disillusion? 
    All right, the dictionary says that "to free or deprive of illusion;the condition or fact of being disenchanting" etc. Then, it comes to what is "illusion". I pretend not to look into such kind of dictionary stupidly to make sure,oh,so,that is called "illusion". But life, at least life for the moment, has always been piled up with illusion. That's why, it is inevitably necessary for you and me, almost all of us to be aware of illusion, or just to be evoked through Disillusioning process.
    Illusion, illusion, illusion...so much illusion has blinded me that I am at a loss wondering if profound disillusionment(awkward usage?) is what I eagerly need for the present. But what if profound reflexion being done, only to find that we still cannot figure out what has happened and why that could happended. And then, struggle to drive ourselves to forget it. Gradually, we may completely forget it but not all of us can manage this. If not, then here comes Memory thing. Does memory really make sense to us? Of course it does, but it depends. 
    Well, now I don't know what I originally intended to talk about. 
    Anyway, disillusion makes memory not that beautiful as it seems. But what the hell makes us care about such memory thing. After all it doesn't really matter.